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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON  
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
By  
 
DONG, YOONJEI  
 
 
In order to improve the institution of developing countries, many donor countries, including 
emerging donors, provide official development assistance (ODA) in the form of technical 
assistance.  However, it has been difficult to assess the outcomes of technical assistance with 
precision, which may frequently be indirect and have long time lags.  This paper analyzes 
evaluation reports and academic papers that attempt to measure the impact of technical 
assistance and empirically tests the relationship between technical assistance and governance.  
Based on a cross-sectional times-series analysis, this paper finds that the effectiveness of 
technical assistance may depend on the country’s initial level of institutional quality.  This 
paper also recommends donor countries to conduct rigorous impact evaluation of technical 
assistance projects in order to improve their effectiveness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There have been various efforts to improve the institutional capacity of developing countries.  
Most importantly, different aid agencies and international organizations provide official 
development assistance in the form of technical assistance projects in order to support their 
institutional and capacity development.  Indeed, institutional development is crucial for 
growth and poverty reduction in developing countries.  Due to the poor management of the 
budget and absence of legal systems, many countries suffer from lack of adequate access to 
health, education and basic services.  
 
At the same time, there has been little understanding of the effectiveness of technical 
assistance.  Most of the studies that examine the impact of technical assistance projects use 
incomplete methods which are affected by the subjectivity of evaluators.  By quantitatively 
analyzing the impact of technical assistance on institutional development, this study aims to 
provide valuable insights on aid effectiveness. This paper starts by introducing the 
international trend of technical assistance and analyzes how technical assistance projects are 
evaluated by international organizations and development agencies.  Before making an 
empirical test of the impact of technical assistance on institutional development, this paper 
examines a number of empirical studies related to aid effectiveness. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Technical assistance has been provided by donor countries in order to improve the 
institutional capacity of the recipient countries.  For example, donor countries provide 
policy advices, send experts or implement training programs to improve the capabilities of 
the public officials and thus foster institutional development. 
２ 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Statistics 
 
The above graph shows the percentage of free-standing technical cooperation over total 
bilateral foreign assistance from 1990 to 2010.  Technical assistance accounts for 
approximately one quarter of total bilateral aid provided by DAC countries from 1990 to 
2010.  At the same time, the percentage of technical assistance over total bilateral aid has 
started to decline since early 2000s.  As weak institutions are considered to be one of the 
main obstacles for economic growth, donor countries have been providing a large percentage 
of official development assistance (ODA) in the form of capacity building or institutional 
development projects.  In fact, OECD reports that one third of technical assistance projects 
are implemented in the form of capacity development projects.1 
 
However, criticisms have been made regarding the effectiveness of technical assistance 
programs.  In 1993, UNDP made an in-depth review of technical assistance and concluded 
that the supply-driven nature of technical assistance is one of the main reasons for the failure 
                                           
1 OECD (2005), Development Co-operation Report 2005: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the 
Development Assistance Committee, 114. 
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of technical assistance programs.2  For instance, donor countries neglect the local context of 
each recipient country and provide irrelevant policy guidance.  According to OECD 
Development Cooperation Report in 2005, technical assistance, especially the provision of 
experts, was criticized for imposing high costs on recipients as well as donor countries due to 
high professional fees.  At the same time, scholarships to study abroad may result in brain 
drain by fostering skilled people to migrate to advanced countries.3 
 
In response to the criticisms, donor countries are making efforts to reform their technical 
assistance programs.  While knowledge, in the past, was considered to be transferred from 
developed to developing countries in a top-down mode, many technical assistance programs 
nowadays try to incorporate local knowledge as well.  Also, emerging countries, including 
South Korea and Brazil, try to share their development experiences through technical 
assistance programs.  For instance, South Korea has launched Knowledge Sharing Program 
in 2004 and provides policy consultations to developing countries through its unique 
development experiences. 
 
Despite the reform efforts made by donor countries and international organizations, the 
effectiveness of technical assistance is yet to be proven.  Donor agencies and international 
organizations try to evaluate their technical assistance at project-level.  Due to the inherent 
difficulties in evaluating technical assistance projects, however, agencies and organizations 
fail to conduct objective evaluation that proves the effectiveness of their projects.  This 
paper further analyzes the evaluation reports issued by different organizations and aims to 
measure the effectiveness of technical assistance at project-level. 
 
                                           
2 Elliot Berg, “Rethinking Technical Cooperation: Reforms for Capacity Building in Africa." United Nations 
Development Program. 1993. 
3 OECD (2005), 124.  
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III. EVALUATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
1. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Different international organizations provide technical assistance to developing countries, 
mostly in order to reform the public sector of the recipient country.  For example, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) aims to enhance the economic policy and financial 
management of developing countries by improving the capacity of public officials and 
helping countries to conduct proper macroeconomic and structural policy reforms.4  In order 
to assess the effectiveness of technical assistance, the IMF made field visits to the recipient 
countries in 2005 and categorized the effect into three different stages – “the immediate 
improvements in the technical capabilities of agencies receiving technical assistance, the 
ability of the agencies to apply and enforce that increased capability, and wherever possible, 
the ultimate outcomes on the ground.”5 
 
The evaluation report by the IMF states that its technical assistance programs are generally 
effective in improving the technical capabilities of agencies.  At the same time, the IMF’s 
evaluation report acknowledges that, due to the different political and environmental situation 
of each country, there is a great variability in the extent to which the agencies make use of 
their enhanced capabilities.  For example, as a result of the technical assistance program 
provided to the banking sector of Cambodia, the country successfully downsized and 
relicensed a number of banks.  The IMF acknowledges that the success stems from the 
strong interest of the highest authorities of National Bank of Cambodia to reform the banking 
                                           
4 International Monetary Fund, Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided by the International Monetary 
Fund, 2005. 
5 Ibid., 8. 
５ 
 
sector.  In contrast, efforts to reform the customs in Cambodia were not successful due to the 
opposition from the strong interest groups.  The case of Cambodia shows that domestic 
ownership is the most important factor that determines the effect of technical assistance.6 At 
the same time, the IMF recognizes the methodological limitations of its study.  While 
technical outcomes, such as the number of trained officials, can be quantified with little 
difficulties, it is complicated to identify the long-term impacts which may be influenced by 
other environmental factors.7  
 
2. World Bank 
Together with the Korea Development Institute (KDI), the World Bank has evaluated a 
technical assistance program provided by South Korea to Dominican Republic in the area of 
export promotion.  The export promotion program was part of the Knowledge Sharing 
Program (KSP) under which South Korea provides policy consultation to developing 
countries.  In 2006, President Leonel Fernandez Reyna of Dominican Republic visited 
Korea in order to participate in seminars on Korea’s development experience.  During his 
visit, he was impressed by the rapid development of Korea and recognized that export-
oriented policies were key to Korean development.  He requested KDI to share the export 
development experience, and as a result, technical assistance for export development program 
started in 2008. 
 
The World Bank used the Capacity Development and Results Framework (CDRF), which 
tracks the intermediate outcomes, including increased awareness and enhanced knowledge, to 
measure the effectiveness of the program.  By analyzing presidential decrees and high-level 
statements that were issued after the program in Dominican Republic, the World Bank 
                                           
6 Ibid., 87. 
7 Ibid., 86. 
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concludes that KSP improved the awareness of high-level government officials.8  Especially, 
the officials became aware of the importance of energy sector reform and public-private 
partnership to promote export. 
 
Compared to the Cambodian case, the program in Dominican Republic successfully 
improved domestic commitment by improving the awareness of high-level officials.  At the 
same time, the method of interpreting high-level statements is vulnerable to the subjectivity 
of the evaluator, and should be based on clearer standard.  In other words, more rigorous 
impact evaluation is needed in order to prove if the program improved the institutional 
capacity of Dominican Republic. Similar to the evaluation framework of the IMF, CDRF is 
not a useful tool to measure the long-term effect of technical assistance projects. 
 
As discussed in the evaluation reports by the IMF and World Bank, technical assistance may 
improve the technical capabilities of public officials, and thus promote institutional 
development.  Despite its objective to improve the institutional and capacity development of 
developing countries, however, the improved capacity resulting from technical assistance 
may not translate into policy or institutional reform as in the case in Cambodia.  Since 
technical assistance has impacts with significant time lags, it is complicated to measure the 
ultimate effects of technical assistance.  Even though objective indicators are chosen to track 
the impact of technical assistance, the indicators may be affected by different environmental 
circumstances in developing countries.  In order to quantify the impact of technical 
assistance on institutional development, innovative impact evaluation method has been 
utilized by some donor countries. This paper will further discuss the theory-based impact 
evaluation developed by the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation. 
                                           
8 Korea Development Institute and World Bank Institute (2011). Using Knowledge Exchange for Capacity 
Development: What Works in Global Practice, 40. 
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IV. IMPACT EVALUATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
 
1. Theory-based Impact Evaluation 
Impact evaluation is defined as a procedure to measure “the net change in outcomes amongst 
a particular group, or groups of people that can be attributed to a specific program.”9  In 
other words, impact evaluation method is a tool to quantify the magnitude of the impact of a 
program, and is widely used to evaluate aid projects.  At the same time, its application to 
technical assistance programs is restricted.  Technical assistance mostly consists of policy 
consultation, expert advice, and training of public officials.  Since its impact is mostly 
indirect and has extended time lags, it is difficult to measure its impact with precision.  For 
example, while the impact of education can be measured by an increase in wages or 
employment rates, it is hard to measure the decline in corruption resulting from a capacity 
building program.  Also, the program may have unintended spillover effects that change the 
behavior of individuals or groups that are not in the program, and thus underestimate the 
impact of the program. 
 
Despite these methodological challenges, donor countries have made continuous efforts to 
measure the impact of technical assistance programs.  For example, the international 
initiative for impact evaluation has formulated a theory-based impact evaluation method 
which tries to predict the counterfactual or what the condition of the target might be in the 
absence of the program of interest, and compare the counterfactual to the impact of the 
intervention.  This paper further introduces a study that evaluates the impact of anti-
corruption policy based on the theory-based impact evaluation method. 
                                           
9 Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany, BMZ Evaluation Division. Micro-
Methods for in Evaluating Governance Interventions, 2011, 10. 
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2. Case Study: Anti-Corruption Policy 
Many donor countries have implemented various types of anti-corruption programs in 
developing countries.  In order to reduce corruption, some development programs include 
monitoring and incentive schemes for public officials.  However, these types of 
interventions are prone to failure when the individuals who are assigned to monitor are 
corrupt as well.  At the same time, monitoring by the citizens may be ineffective when they 
do not have enough incentives or enough skills or knowledge to monitor.10 
 
To find out the most effective anti-corruption strategy, Benjamin Olken, Economics Professor 
at MIT, conducted an impact evaluation based on road project cases in Indonesia.  Olken 
selected 608 villages and randomly divided them into four groups.  For the first group, he 
explained that the road project will be audited by the central government.  For the second 
group, he organized village-level accountability meetings, while, for the third group, not only 
village-level meetings were organized but also survey forms were distributed to villagers.  
The fourth group served as the control group for his study. Olken measured each group’s 
level of corruption by calculating the difference between reported expenditure and individual 
engineers’ estimates. 
 
Interestingly, he found that corruption dropped significantly, by 8%, when the village was 
audited by the central government, while monitoring by the villagers had little impact on 
reducing the level of corruption.11  The author explains that, since reducing corruption in 
public service is a public good, villagers have incentives to free-ride on the contribution made 
by active citizens.  In contrast, individuals in the first group were afraid of the punishment 
                                           
10 Ibid., 18. 
11 Ibid., 19. 
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by the central government, and changed their behaviors.  Based on the findings of the 
evaluation, development practitioners can predict which anti-corruption policies work best in 
different countries and redesign their anti-corruption programs. 
 
Compared to previous evaluations of technical assistance by the IMF and World Bank, which 
mostly relied on expert judgment, the aforementioned study used quantitative methods to 
evaluate the impact of anti-corruption strategies.  Specifically, the study conducted 
randomized control trials in order to compare the effect of the intervention to the 
counterfactual.  As a result, the study can be regarded as a more rigorous evaluation of the 
intervention, and provides policy guidance for those who implement technical assistance 
programs in developing countries.   
 
At the same time, it is difficult to generalize project-level impact evaluation, and thus 
provides little implication on the effectiveness of other technical assistance projects.  By 
empirically testing the relationship between technical assistance and institutional 
development index, this study attempts to provide valuable findings on the effectiveness of 
technical assistance.  Before introducing the findings, this paper will analyze statistical 
studies that examine the effect of official development assistance, especially technical 
assistance. 
 
V. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON AID EFFECTIVENESS 
Many scholars have conducted statistical studies to measure the impact of foreign assistance. 
Most importantly, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that aid has a negative impact on growth 
in countries with bad monetary, fiscal and trade policies, and thus conclude that aid should be 
given to countries with good policies.  The findings of Burnside and Dollar (2000) provide 
important policy recommendations for donor countries.  Since the improvement of 
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governance or institution is critical for positive impact of aid on growth, they suggest that 
technical assistance would be a good instrument for improving governance in developing 
countries. 
 
Nevertheless, there are limited studies that test the impact of technical assistance on 
institutional development.  Most recently, Busse and Groning (2009) find that an increase in 
foreign assistance leads to a worsening of governance due to increased rent-seeking behaviors 
by the incumbents.  However, their study does not focus on technical assistance as their 
primary independent variable.  While foreign assistance has a negative impact on 
governance, it is possible that technical assistance fosters institutional development. 
 
Some scholars have decomposed foreign assistance into several categories and examined the 
impact of technical assistance.  Mavrotas (2002) examined how different types of aid have 
dissimilar impacts on growth in India from 1970 to 1992.  According to Mavrotas, program 
aid and project assistance exerts negative impact on India’s growth during the concerned 
period.  However, in the presence of financial policy variable which is measured by Money 
Supply over GDP, the coefficients for program aid and project assistance become positively 
significant, while the coefficient for technical assistance becomes strongly negative.  The 
author concludes that different types of aid have differential impact on growth in the presence 
of policies, and emphasizes the importance of decomposition of aid in aid effectiveness 
studies. 
 
Other scholars have conducted cross-sectional analysis to measure the impact of foreign 
assistance, including technical assistance, on governance.  Rajan and Subramanian (2007) 
examined how industries that are more dependent on good governance perform under larger 
amount of foreign assistance.  They quantitatively found that technical assistance is not 
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different from other types of assistance in the aspect that it exhibits disproportionately 
negative effect on industries that are more dependent on governance.  In other words, the 
study finds that technical assistance is associated with a lower level of governance. 
 
In addition, Knack (2001) explains that foreign assistance, especially technical assistance, 
had a negative impact on institutional development from 1982 to 1995.  Knack writes that 
aid dependence fosters rent-seeking and corruption, and thus reduces institutional quality.  
He concludes that aid should be provided in the form of direct budgetary support in order to 
improve administrative capacity of recipient countries. However, Knack does not prove that 
direct budgetary support strengthen the administrative capacity of recipient countries. In 
reality, the direct budget support mode of aid requires a greater capacity and better institution 
of recipient countries.  Rather, repeated program assistance implemented by the recipients 
may more effectively strengthen their administrative capacity, and this strengthened capacity 
will enable the recipient to efficiently utilize the direct budget support mode of aid.  He also 
examines the time period between 1982 and 1995, and it is possible that the impact of 
technical assistance became positive after the reform efforts during the 1990s.  This study 
aims to build upon the findings of previous scholars and empirically test the impact of 
technical assistance on institutional development from 1990 to 2010. 
 
VI. METHODOLOGY 
 
The empirical work of this study aims to answer mainly two questions: (1) What is the impact 
of technical assistance on institutional development? (2) Under what conditions would the 
impact of technical assistance improve?  Based on the longitudinal data of 89 countries from 
1990 to 2010, this paper quantitatively tests the impact of technical assistance on institutional 
development.  The basic model of the empirical work stands as follows: 
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△ICRG it = ß0 + TAit + ƴXit + αi + ƛt + Ɛit 
 
where △ICRGit indicates the change in ICRG value from year 1990 for country i at period t. 
TAit, the variable of interest, indicates the amount of technical assistance received as a 
percentage of GDP, Xit stands for the set of control variables, αi for the set of country 
dummies, ƛt for the set of time dummies, and Ɛit for the error term.  In order to control for 
other factors that may have affected institutional development during this period, variables 
such as population growth, trade as a percentage of GDP, annual GDP growth rate, school 
enrollment rate, ethnic and religious tensions, external and internal conflicts, democratic 
accountability, government stability and government consumption as a percentage of GDP 
were included.  In addition, country dummies were included in the model to control for 
country fixed effects, and time dummies to account for secular changes.   
 
In order to control for any endogeneity problem, another set of tests were conducted by 
including ICRG values of the previous two years. The equation stands as follows: 
 
 △ICRG it = ß0 + ß1ICRGit-1 + ß2ICRGit-2 + ß3TAit + ƴXit + ƛt + Ɛit  
 
For instance, technical assistance may be given to countries with high institutional quality 
and this reserve causality problem is controlled by including the institutional qualities of the 
respective country during the previous two years.   
 
Several tests were conducted in order to specify the method of analysis.  First, Hausman test 
was conducted in order to determine if unobserved country heterogeneities are uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables.  Based on the test result, we were not able to assume that the 
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unobserved effect is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable, and chose the fixed effects 
model over random effects model (Appendix 3).  One drawback of using fixed effects model 
is that it is impossible to measure the impact of time-invariant variable.  
 
In order to test if the model suffers from heteroskedasticity problem, likelihood-ratio test was 
conducted.  Heteroskedasticity problem does not cause bias or inconsistency in the OLS 
estimators, but results in invalid t-statistic and confidence interval due to incorrect variance.  
The likelihood-ratio test result showed that the standard errors of the OLS estimates were 
inflated due to heteroskedasticity problem (Appendix 4). For this reason, this paper also 
presents the result from Feasible GLS estimation method which provides more consistent and 
efficient estimator than OLS.  
 
This paper uses cross-country time-series data from 1990 to 2010 for 89 countries. The 
quality of governance is measured by three sub-components of the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), which are the degree of corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. 
The ICRG data has been previously used by many scholars, including Knack (2001) and 
Busse and Groning (2009), in order to test aid effectiveness. 
 
Corruption index measures corruption level within the political system. The scale ranges 
from zero, which indicates the highest level of corruption, to six, which indicates the lowest 
level of corruption.  Law and order index is a composite index of law, which measures the 
strength and fairness of the legal system, and order, which assesses the citizens’ adherence to 
the law. The scale ranges from zero, which indicates the lowest level of law and order, to six, 
which indicates the highest level of law and order. Bureaucratic quality is also rescaled into 
an index that ranges from zero to six. The highest score is given to countries where the 
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bureaucracy has the capability to govern without radical changes in policy or disruptions in 
public services. Since governance indicator in our study is the summation of three-
subcomponents, the total point ranges from zero, which indicates low institutional quality, to 
eighteen, which indicates high institutional quality. 
 
Instead of using the total ICRG rating as the dependent variable, this paper subtracts the 
governance value at the respective year from the initial governance value for each country in 
order to measure the impact of technical assistance on the changes in institutional quality.  
At the same time, the limited opportunities of highly-scored countries to increase their value 
can be controlled by including initial governance value in the model.  Since time-invariant 
variables are omitted from the fixed-effect model, initial governance value is only included 
when FGLS method is used.  
 
In order to account for technical assistance, this paper uses the data on technical cooperation 
grants compiled by the World Bank Databank. The amount of technical assistance received 
by each recipient country is expressed as a percentage of each country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  In case technical assistance has a negative impact on institutional 
development, recipient countries with higher amount of technical assistance are likely to have 
decreasing governance scores over time, compared to other countries in the sample. 
 
Apart from the two main variables, a number of variables are included in order to control for 
country-specific factors, or political, social and economic contexts that may influence 
institutional quality.  The control variables are decided based on the existing theoretical and 
empirical studies on institution. 
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First, many scholars found that higher educational attainment promote institutional 
development, since better educated citizens are more likely to become involved in public 
decision making procedure and demand better governance.12  Educational attainment is 
measured by secondary school enrollment rate in this study for several reasons.  Many 
students from developing countries do not proceed to secondary school after primary school, 
and the enrollment to secondary education is identified as the largest hurdle in education for 
many developing countries.  In addition, students who have received secondary education 
are most likely to be involved in public decision making process to influence institutional 
development.  Similarly, larger countries are more likely to have larger human resources that 
can contribute to institutional development, and thus higher population growth rate may also 
be associated with institutional development. Thus, the coefficients for educational 
attainment and population are expected to be positive. 
 
As a country better integrates into the global market, larger number of economic agents will 
be affected by the country’s institutional quality.  As a result, rent-seeking and corruption 
would be more difficult and policy-makers will have increased incentives to improve their 
governance.  For this reason, we expect that trade or foreign direct investment flow will 
foster institutional development. Besides, economic growth provides for the required 
financial resources for the enhancement of governance, and may positively affect institutional 
development.13  Therefore, the coefficients for trade openness and economic growth are 
expected to be positive. 
 
Endogenous characteristics of the country including religious and ethnic tensions or internal 
                                           
12 Matthias Busse & Steffen Gröning. "Does Foreign Aid Improve Governance?." Economics Letters 104, no. 2 
(2009): 77. 
13 Ibid., 77. 
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and external conflicts can also affect institutional development. It is expected that countries 
with higher rate of tensions and conflicts will have lower institutional quality, since resources 
that could be spent on improving governance are wasted on resolving conflicts and tensions. 
Ethnic tension variable assesses the degree of tension arising from racial, national, or 
language separations. Religious tension measures the degree of religious tension that stems 
from the domination of the society by a single religious group. For the aforementioned 
variables including religious and ethnic tensions and internal and external conflicts, lower 
ratings indicate higher tensions and conflicts. 
 
A country with democratic government tends to have less corruption and stronger rule of law.  
For this reason, democratic accountability is expected have positive impact on institutional 
development.  Democratic accountability measures not just whether there are free and fair 
elections, but how responsive government is to its people.  Similarly, government stability, 
which measures the government’s ability to stay in office and carry out its declared program, 
is expected to have positive impact on institutional development. Lastly, higher government 
consumption may be required for improving institutional quality, and it is expected that 
government consumption has positive association with institutional development.  
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VII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Change in ICRG Value 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) GLS 
Initial ICRG   -3.313   (0.358)*** 
TA/GDP (%) 0.08 0.047 0.089 (0.045)* (0.059) (0.030)*** 
ODA/GDP (%)  0.02   (0.012)*  
Population Growth -0.139 -0.152 -0.082 (0.074)* (0.075)** (0.038)** 
GDP Growth -0.006 -0.009 -0.001 (0.009) (0.01) (0.005) 
Trade/GDP (%) -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)* 
School enrollment 
-0.009 -0.01 -0.004 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Democratic Accountability 0.428 0.434 0.303 (0.045)*** (0.046)*** (0.026)*** 
Ethnic Tension 0.325 0.346 0.356 (0.061)*** (0.062)*** (0.037)*** 
Religious Tension 0.206 0.198 0.193 (0.062)*** (0.062)*** (0.046)*** 
Conflict 0.06 0.064 0.102 (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.012)*** 
Government Stability 0.096 0.096 0.055 (0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.020)*** 
FDI/GDP (%) -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) 
Government Consumption/GDP 
(%) 
0.04 0.037 0.034 
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.008)*** 
Constant -4.481 -4.476 24.503 (0.625)*** (0.630)*** (3.099)*** 
R2 0.35 0.35  
Observations 1,131 1,114 1,131 
Note: The quantities in parentheses below the estimates are the standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at, or below, 1, 5, 10 percents respectively. All specifications include time dummies, while (3) GLS includes 
country dummies as well as time dummies. 
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Equations (1) and (2) present the results from OLS Fixed Effects method, whereas equation 
(3) illustrates the result from Feasible-GLS method.  All of the equations control for 
unobserved country fixed effects and time-specific factors.  According to equation (1), 
technical assistance has a positive impact on institutional development at 10% significance 
level.  As TA/GDP increases by one percent, the change in ICRG increases by 0.08. The 
coefficient for technical assistance is two times larger than that for government consumption.  
This may imply that spending on technical assistance increases the institutional quality of the 
country by larger degree than spending on public expenditure.  When ODA/GDP (%) is 
included in equation (2) as one of the control variables, the positive impact of technical 
assistance becomes statistically insignificant.  This may result from the high correlation 
between ODA and technical assistance. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficient between Technical Assistance and ODA 
Correlation Coefficient TA/GDP ODA/GDP 
TA/GDP 1.00 - 
ODA/GDP 0.67 1.00 
 
Table 2 shows the high correlation coefficient between technical assistance and ODA, which 
amounts to 0.67.  Due to the high correlation between technical assistance and official 
development assistance, it may be difficult to uncover the partial effect of technical assistance 
when ODA is included in the model.  
 
Equation (3) controls for heteroskedasticity by using FGLS method.  Country dummies are 
included along with time dummies in order to control for country-fixed effects.  While time-
invariant variables, such as initial ICRG value, are omitted from the fixed-effects model, 
these variables can be included in the FGLS method.  As shown in equation (3), the initial 
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ICRG value has a negatively significant effect on institutional quality.  In other words, 
countries with initially higher ICRG value tends to have lower changes in ICRG value.  This 
can be explained by the limited opportunities of the high-rating countries in improving their 
scores.  
 
The statistical findings also show that endogenous variables are significant factors that 
improve governance.  Especially, lower level of ethnic and religious tensions or external and 
internal conflicts lead to higher institutional quality.  Besides, higher democratic 
accountability and government stability leads to institutional development.  As previously 
explained, larger number of population means that there are greater numbers of people to 
make reforms.  At the same time, larger population may signify that it is harder to reach 
consensus and thus more difficult to have institutional development.  The result suggests 
that the latter effect is stronger and population growth has negative impact on institutional 
development.  Government consumption, which represents the country’s fiscal policy, also 
has a positively significant impact on institutional development.  Interestingly, this paper 
was not able to prove any significant impact of economic growth, trade openness or FDI on 
institutional development. 
 
Even though a number of control variables are included in the model, there exist possibilities 
for endogeneity problem.  For instance, donors may provide technical assistance to countries 
with higher institutional quality.  In order to control for the afore-mentioned problem, the 
lagged ICRG value is included in the following model.  At the same time, Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) argue that aid is more effective under good policies.  The following model 
also includes an interaction term between technical assistance and initial ICRG value to find 
out if the effectiveness of technical assistance also depends on the institutional quality. 
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Table 3: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Change in ICRG Value 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) GLS 
ICRG(T-1) 
0.684 0.743 0.66 0.662 0.669 
(0.029)*** (0.024)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.025)*** 
ICRG(T-2) 
-0.138 -0.14 -0.144 -0.144 -0.129 
(0.027)*** (0.022)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.021)*** 
TA/GDP (%) 
0.051 -0.202 -0.492 -0.516 -0.362 
(0.033) (0.050)*** (0.121)*** (0.151)*** (0.050)*** 
TA2 
   0.001  
   (0.007)  
ODA/GDP (%) 
 -0.006 0.002 0.002 0.008 
 (0.003)** (0.009) (0.009) (0.005)* 
Trade/GDP (%) 
-0.001  -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
School Enrollment 
-0.007  -0.007 -0.012 -0.011 
(0.005)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)* 
Democratic Accountability 
0.207 0.183 0.218 0.219 0.127 
(0.034)*** (0.026)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.021)*** 
Ethnic Tension 
0.193 0.163 0.202 0.201 0.184 
(0.046)*** (0.035)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.029)*** 
Religious Tension 
0.047 0.081 0.062 0.063 0.033 
(0.046) (0.035)** (0.046) (0.046) (0.034) 
Conflict 
0.035 0.062 0.043 0.044 0.057 
(0.015)** (0.011)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.009)*** 
Government Stability 
0.109 0.083 0.102 0.104 0.065 
(0.025)*** (0.019)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.015)*** 
TA*(Initial ICRG) 
 0.035 0.072 0.074 0.049 
 (0.008)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.008)*** 
Constant 
-6.423 -7.501 -6.344 -6.231 -9.082 
(0.435)*** (0.237)*** (0.435)*** (0.489)*** (0.425)*** 
R2 0.63 0.7 0.64 0.64  
N 1,148  1,708 1,134 1,134 
Note: The quantities in parentheses below the estimates are the standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at, or below, 1, 5, 10 percents respectively. All specifications include time dummies, while (5) GLS includes 
country dummies as well as time dummies. 
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Once the model controls for endogeneity problem by including ICRG values of the previous 
two years, technical assistance no longer has positive impact on institutional development.  
Equation (1) shows that technical assistance does not have statistically significant impact on 
institutional development.  The change in the coefficient of technical assistance implies that 
technical assistance may have been provided to countries with higher institutional quality or 
some unobservable variables that positively affect institutional quality are positively 
correlated with the amount of technical assistance.   
 
In order to investigate the effectiveness of technical assistance depending on the level of 
institutional quality in the initial period, which is 1990, an interaction term between technical 
assistance and initial ICRG variable was included in Table 3 (2), (3), (4) and (5).  For the 
equations that include the interaction term, the coefficient for technical assistance does not 
have any significant meaning since the value indicates the impact of technical assistance on 
institutional quality for countries with zero initial ICRG value.  Interestingly, the coefficient 
for the interaction term is positively significant, which implies that the effectiveness of 
technical assistance improves as the initial ICRG value increases.  
Table 4: Summary of Initial ICRG Variable 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Initial ICRG 7.421 2.995 
 
Table 4 describes the mean value and standard deviation of initial ICRG variable for 
countries in the sample.  In order to investigate the impact of technical assistance for 
countries with average level of initial ICRG, another test was conducted by subtracting the 
mean initial ICRG value from the interaction term between technical assistance and initial 
ICRG.  
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Table 5: Initial ICRG-Centered Result 
Dependent Variable: Change in ICRG Value (OLS-FE) 
Initial ICRG-Centered Result 
ICRGT-1 
0.743 
(0.024)*** 
ICRGT-2 
-0.14 
(0.022)*** 
TA/GDP (%) 
0.06 
(0.025)** 
ODA/GDP (%) 
-0.006 
(0.003)** 
Democratic Accountability 
0.183 
(0.026)*** 
Ethnic Tension 
0.163 
(0.035)*** 
Religious Tension 
0.081 
(0.035)** 
Conflict 
0.062 
(0.011)*** 
Government Stability 
0.083 
(0.019)*** 
TA*(Initial ICRG-Centered) 
0.035 
(0.008)*** 
Constant 
-7.501 
(0.237)*** 
R2 0.7 
N 1,708 
Note: The quantities in parentheses below the estimates are the standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at, or below, 1, 5, 10 percents respectively. All specifications include time dummies.  
 
Table 5 shows that the impact of technical assistance on institutional development for 
countries with average-level of initial ICRG is 0.06.  In other words, the change in ICRG 
value increases by 0.06 with a one-percent increase in technical assistance over GDP.  This 
value is statistically significant at 5% significance level.   
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Table 6: Effectiveness of Technical Assistance Depending on Initial ICRG 
Initial ICRG High = 10.42 Low = 4.42 
TA/GDP 
0.166 -0.046 
(0.042)*** (0.024)* 
Note: The quantities in parentheses below the estimates are the standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at, or below, 1, 5, 10 percents respectively.  Regressions in Table 6 follow the same model specifications from 
that in Table 5. 
 
Table 6 shows that the impact of technical assistance on institutional quality change depends 
on the initial level of institutional quality.  For those countries that have initial institutional 
quality of one standard deviation above the mean value, one percent increase in technical 
assistance over GDP is likely to increase the institutional quality by 0.166.  In contrast, for 
those countries where the initial level of institutional quality is one standard deviation lower 
than the mean value, one percent increase in technical assistance over GDP tends to decrease 
the institutional quality by 0.046.   
 
Burnside and Dollar argues that countries with bad policies should be provided with technical 
assistance, since foreign assistance has a deteriorating effect on growth for countries with bad 
policies.  However, the regression results of Table 6 show that technical assistance may have 
positive impact in countries with higher initial level of institutional quality, whereas technical 
assistance may have negative impact in countries with bad institutional quality.  The result 
implies that technical assistance is not an adequate solution for countries with bad 
institutional quality. 
 
In order to test if the result from Table 5 is robust when time lag was applied to technical 
assistance, another test was conducted using the following equation:   
 
△ICRGit = ß0 + ß1ICRGit-2 + ß2TAit-1 + ƴXit + ƛt + Ɛit 
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Table 7: Time-Lag on Technical Assistance 
Dependent Variable: Change in ICRG Value (OLS-FE) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
ICRGT-2 
0.297 0.281 
(0.024)*** (0.024)*** 
TAT-1 (% of GDP) 
0.05 -0.538 
(0.04) (0.135)*** 
Population Growth 
-0.064 -0.081 
(0.071) -0.071 
GDP Growth 
-0.002 -0.004 
(0.009) -0.009 
Trade/GDP (%) 
-0.001 -0.002 
(0.003) -0.003 
School Enrollment 
-0.008 -0.008 
(0.006) -0.006 
Democratic Accountability 
0.361 0.365 
(0.043)*** (0.042)*** 
Ethnic Tension 
0.278 0.285 
(0.057)*** (0.057)*** 
Religious Tension 
0.09 0.097 
(0.058) (0.057)* 
Conflict 
0.067 0.071 
(0.020)*** (0.019)*** 
Government Stability 
0.152 0.144 
(0.031)*** (0.031)*** 
Government Consumption 
0.032 0.032 
(0.013)** (0.013)** 
TAT-1* Initial ICRG 
 0.077 
 (0.017)*** 
Constant 
-6.354 -6.232 
(0.608)*** (0.603)*** 
R2 0.43 0.44 
N 1,133 1,133 
Note: The quantities in parentheses below the estimates are the standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at, or below, 1, 5, 10 percents respectively. All specifications include time dummies.  
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The regression result with one-year time lag on technical assistance is consistent with the 
previous findings from Table 5.  The interaction term between technical assistance in the 
previous year and the initial ICRG value is positively significant at 5% significance level.  
 
 
VIII. LIMITATIONS 
OECD reports that poorer countries receive smaller share of technical assistance due to 
limited absorptive capacity.  The report explains that technical assistance is concentrated in 
countries that are experiencing rapid economic transformation.14  Since countries that are 
experiencing rapid transformation may have higher institutional quality, our estimator for 
technical assistance may be overvalued.  In order to control for this endogeneity problem, 
this paper includes ICRG values in the previous two years and applies time lag on the 
technical assistance variable.  Even though this approach can partially control for the 
endogeneity problem, an instrumental variable approach may be a more effective way. 
 
The model can be improved in several ways to test the impact of technical assistance. First, 
the impact of technical assistance may vary according to the income level or location of the 
recipient countries.  For this reason, the sample can be divided into several groups 
depending on their income level and region, and statistical tests can be conducted for each 
group.  In addition, institution is a cluster of different components including corruption 
level, bureaucratic quality and rule of law.  If it is possible to divide the technical assistance 
into different sub-categories, the effectiveness of technical assistances on anti-corruption, 
legal system, and economic management can be tested separately. 
 
                                           
14 OECD (2005). 117. 
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IX. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper has analyzed different studies that investigate the impact of technical assistance 
projects.  Due to the unique nature of technical assistance, it is difficult to assess with 
precision the outcomes of technical assistance, which may frequently be indirect and have 
long time lags.  For this reason, a theory-based impact evaluation method was developed by 
the international initiative for impact evaluation in order to evaluate technical assistance 
using quantitative indicators.  For instance, the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy was 
evaluated through randomized control trials as the case in Indonesia demonstrated, and the 
study has proven that monitoring by the central government is most effective in reducing the 
level of corruption. 
 
In order to improve the effectiveness of technical assistance programs, it is important for aid 
agencies to conduct rigorous impact evaluations of their programs. Unlike evaluations made 
by the IMF and World Bank, which only track the changes in technical capacities of 
individuals, the impact evaluation methods allow development practitioners to assess the 
program’s impact on the intended objectives of the program.  Besides, development 
practitioners may be able to identify the obstacles in achieving the intended results, and thus 
improve the effectiveness of technical assistance.  In addition, effectiveness of different 
programs can be compared, such as the case study of anti-corruption policy, and the findings 
may provide valuable policy guidance to development practitioners. 
 
At the same time, there exist many practical barriers when implementing the theory-based 
impact evaluation method.  First of all, evaluators should participate in the program from the 
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beginning, and the cost of the program will rise substantially.  In addition, due to the 
difficulties in quantifying the outcomes of technical assistance, innovative methods are 
needed such as the case in Indonesia.  For example, Professor Olken measured corruption by 
finding the difference between expected and actual expenditure.  Because of these practical 
barriers, donor countries may adopt less rigorous evaluation framework such as the Capacity 
Development Results Framework in the short-run, to measure the increased awareness and 
knowledge of stakeholders. 
 
Furthermore, this paper has conducted regression analyses to measure the impact of technical 
assistance on governance and empirically found that technical assistance may have positively 
significant effect on institutional development for countries with average level of institutional 
quality.  Also, the interaction term between institutional quality in 1990 and technical 
assistance is positively significant, which implies that the effectiveness of technical assistance 
may depend on the level of institutional quality.  In other words, technical assistance may 
improve institutional quality for countries with high level of institutional quality from the 
beginning, whereas technical assistance may have negative impact in countries with bad 
institutional quality.   
 
Even though technical assistance aims to improve the institutional capacity of recipient 
countries, technical assistance may not be an adequate solution for countries with bad 
institutional quality.  Instead, endogenous factors, such as democratic accountability, ethnic 
tension, conflict and government stability, have significant impact on institutional 
development.  Indeed, as mentioned in the IMF evaluation report of technical assistance 
programs, political will and country-specific contexts are the most important factors to 
translate the improved capacities of public officials into actual policy or institutional reform.  
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X. APPENDIX 
1. Country Coverage of the Data Set 
Albania Guatemala Oman 
Algeria Guinea Pakistan 
Angola Guinea-Bissau Panama 
Argentina Guyana Papua New Guinea 
Armenia Haiti Paraguay 
Azerbaijan Honduras Peru 
Bangladesh India Philippines 
Belarus Indonesia Senegal 
Bolivia Iran, Islamic Rep. Serbia 
Botswana Iraq Sierra Leone 
Brazil Jamaica South Africa 
Burkina Faso Jordan Sri Lanka 
Cameroon Kazakhstan Sudan 
Chile Kenya Suriname 
China Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic 
Colombia Liberia Tanzania 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Libya Thailand 
Congo, Rep. Madagascar Togo 
Costa Rica Malawi Trinidad and Tobago 
Cote d'Ivoire Malaysia Tunisia 
Croatia Mali Turkey 
Cuba Mexico Uganda 
Dominican Republic Moldova Ukraine 
Ecuador Mongolia Uruguay 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Morocco Venezuela, RB 
El Salvador Mozambique Vietnam 
Ethiopia Namibia Yemen, Rep. 
Gabon Nicaragua Zambia 
Gambia, The Niger Zimbabwe 
Ghana Nigeria  
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2. Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Recipient 1869 45 25.697 1 89 
Year 1869 2000 6.057 1990 2010 
TA/GDP (%) 1829 1.281 1.887 -0.308 20.533 
Initial ICRG 1797 7.421 2.995 1.083 14.5 
Total ICRG 1797 8.075 2.470 0.750 16.167 
Change in ICRG 1821 0.646 2.917 -7.750 9.500 
ODA/GDP (%) 1755 6.942 12.065 -0.730 181.014 
Population Growth 1869 1.783 1.172 -5.814 11.181 
GDP Growth 1841 3.797 6.776 -51.031 106.280 
Trade/GDP (%) 1783 72.879 36.075 10.831 280.361 
School enrollment 1257 58.834 26.897 5.056 111.181 
Democratic Accountability 1797 3.346 1.402 0 6 
Ethnic Tension 1797 3.777 1.392 0 6 
Religious Tension 1797 4.399 1.358 0 6 
Conflict (Internal + External) 1797 18.139 3.523 1.5 24 
Government Stability 1797 7.966 2.123 1 12 
FDI 1803 3.352 7.480 -82.892 144.516 
Government Consumption 1768 14.067 5.894 2.047 45.263 
TA * (Initial ICRG) 1779 8.736 12.601 -1.232 98.777 
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3. Hausman Test for Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects Model 
 
 
The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is rejected, which signifies that there are systematic 
differences in the coefficients for fixed effects and random effects models.  As a result, fixed 
effects model should be used in order to control for country-specific effects. 
 
4. Likelihood-Ratio Test 
 
 
The null hypothesis for the likelihood-ratio test is rejected, which signifies that the error 
terms are not homeskedastic.  The model is tested using Feasible-GLS method in order to 
control for heteroskedasticity problem.  
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0003
                          =       44.02
                 chi2(17) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
government~n      .0501827     .0441025        .0060802        .0039074
   inflation      .0000196     .0000192        3.86e-07               .
         fdi     -.0057874    -.0052744        -.000513        .0012031
   stability      .0215177     .0153264        .0061913        .0025397
conflictex~l      .1146536     .1104597        .0041939        .0008082
religioust~n      .2678149     .2342919         .033523        .0128486
ethnictens~n      .4357135     .4358094        -.000096        .0131231
democratic~y      .3924529     .3861222        .0063307        .0061894
schoolenro~s     -.0389039    -.0357714       -.0031324        .0016039
industryva~p       .007861     .0050002        .0028608        .0017164
  tradeofgdp      -.004205       -.0034        -.000805        .0010231
gdpgrowtha~l      -.014741    -.0135562       -.0011847               .
population~l      -.141065    -.1332009       -.0078641        .0106497
       odasq      .0014267     .0014306       -3.97e-06        .0000284
netodarece~i     -.0524196    -.0566924        .0042727        .0038976
        tasq     -.0073171    -.0077244        .0004073        .0007095
       tagdp      .1688966     .1761542       -.0072576        .0142268
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
(Assumption: . nested in hetero)                       Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                  LR chi2(85) =    479.97
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5. Data Source 
 
 
Variable Data Source 
TA/GDP (%) World Bank Databank 
ICRG PRS Group 
ODA/GDP (%) World Bank Databank 
Population Growth World Bank Databank 
GDP Growth World Bank Databank 
Trade/GDP (%) World Bank Databank 
School enrollment World Bank Databank 
Democratic Accountability PRS Group 
Ethnic Tension PRS Group 
Religious Tension PRS Group 
Conflict (Internal + External) PRS Group 
Government Stability PRS Group 
FDI World Bank Databank 
Government Consumption World Bank Databank 
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